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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
A. The Standard Form 22 Bond Provides Indemnification Only 
Against an Employe's Dishonest and Criminal Acts Resulting in 
Loss. 
The contract at issue in this case is a standardized 
Savings and Loan Bond, Form 22. Through the Bond, Aetna and 
Home Savings entered into a contract of indemnification to 
replace identical Standard Form 22 coverage previously 
issued by Fidelity & Deposit of Maryland ("F&D"). Standard 
Form 22 provides a variety of coverages; however, the coverage 
involved in this case was indemnification for losses caused or 
"resulting directly from" employee dishonesty, as that term is 
defined in the contract. (Aetna Bond, Tr. Ex. 343, Rider 
6041.) That provision of the Aetna Bond covered losses 
"sustained by [Home Savings] at any time but discovered during 
[Aetna's] Bond Period." (Id., Preamble.) 
The purpose of Standard Form 22 is to protect a 
Savings and Loan "against the dishonesty or crime of its 
employees." Levey v. Jamison, 82 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir. 
1936). It does not cover losses caused by the business 
practices or strategies of Home Savings itself, id. "The 
bond is aimed at covering losses that employees intend to cause 
their employer, not losses involving fraudulent practices 
directed against customers that serve to benefit an employer 
acting in concert with the employee." Continental Corp. v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 892 F.2d 540, 549 n. 5 (7th Cir. 
1989) . 
The Bond is a cohesive, integrated document. Its 
multiple provisions intentionally allocate to the insured and 
the insurer a defined set of risks and responsibilities. The 
Bond's bright line definition of dishonesty avoids previously 
common disputes about what constituted employee dishonesty. 
(Rider 6041.) By requiring the insurer to reimburse the 
savings institution for "losses sustained at any time" but only 
if they were caused by dishonesty "discovered during the bond 
period," Standard Form 22 prevents allocating to one insurer 
the consequences of risks covered by a prior carrier's bond. 
(Preamble and Section 9.) By imposing objective and per se 
tests to determine when discovery occurs, and by requiring 
timely notice as soon as practical to the proper carrier, 
disputes about who was the proper insurer are minimized. 
(Section 4 and Rider 6091.) 
Even more particularly, although the Bond generally 
covers all employees, the parties agreed in advance that when 
the insured gains knowledge of the dishonest acts of an 
employee then coverage for that employee immediately 
terminates. (Section 11.) By allocating to the insured the 
risk of hiring or continuing employment of a dishonest 
employee, the Bond discourages such a foolish practice. By the 
-2-
Bond's express proximate cause requirement (Rider 6041), the 
insured is discouraged from allowing the root problem of 
dishonesty to be compounded by losses that more accurately 
reflect poor management, or improper response to the discovery 
of employee dishonesty. 
Early discovery of dishonesty, early warning to the 
proper surety, and prudence in deciding whether to allow a 
dishonest employee to begin or continue employment at a Savings 
and Loan, are valid goals• In pursuit of these objectives, 
both parties agree in Standard Form 22 to terms with 
established meanings to both the surety industry and the 
savings and loan industry. See Sharp v. Federal Savings & 
Loan Ins. Corp.. 858 F.2d 1042, 1046-47 (5th Cir. 1988). When 
those terms are properly applied in order to achieve the 
intended results, the insured should not be heard to claim 
ambiguity or to offer strained interpretations that frustrate 
the risk-allocating functions which those provisions serve. 
Furthermore, because an insured can obtain on-going 
coverage under Standard Form 22 from successive sureties, both 
public policy and the provisions of Form 22 require that the 
insured provide pertinent information to the new carrier before 
expecting uninterrupted coverage. Where a subsequent bond is 
purchased to provide unbroken coverage under Standard Form 22, 
the insured must inform the new bonding company (here, Aetna) 
of those facts which it should have provided to the surety 
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under the previous bond (F&D). Fundamentally, an insured 
cannot improve its position or obtain broader coverage than it 
had under a previous bond by changing sureties or by entering 
into a new Standard Form 22 contract. 
B. Aetna's Primary Arguments are Interconnected and Mutually 
Consistent with the Purpose of Standard Form 22. 
From the very outset of this case, as evidenced by 
Aetna's early motion to add Home's prior bond carrier (F&D) 
as a necessary party, Aetna has contended that if Standard 
Form 22 coverage was available to Home, it was under F&D's 
bond. In any event, several specific provisions of Aetna's 
Bond absolutely preclude Home's claims for coverage from Aetna. 
Home's management knew it had a dishonest employee 
and had fired him seven months before it applied for the Bond 
(Point I). Management knew that its employee was involved in a 
series of unusual loans which had been previously approved by 
management and which were going bad before Home contracted with 
Aetna (Point II). Management failed to provide timely notice 
in order to lock in coverage under F&D's bond (Point VI). 
Instead, Home's management speculated on the outcome of these 
events and did not notify F&D or inform Aetna until months 
after the Bond was in place that the AFCO investors had filed 
suit and were beincj sued by Home, or that Home was already 
booking losses related to the investor loans (Point III). At 
trial, there was ample evidence that Home's management, by 
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voluntarily entering into an intimate business relationship 
with the Grant Affleck companies on a speculative investment 
scheme, was the primary or overriding cause of the loss 
(Point V). 
Aetna's consistent analysis also applies to the other 
issues raised on appeal. The AFCO investor losses resulted 
from a business decision involving trading in securities, a 
risk specifically excluded under the Aetna Bond (Points IV and 
VIII)• In addition, even given the trial court's unwaivering 
efforts to find coverage, the court improperly refused to grant 
Aetna an offset for the financial benefit which Home received 
from its participation in the AFCO scheme (Point VII). In 
bringing this action, Home's management has tried to evade its 
responsibility for the losses by using Larry Glad as a 
scapegoat. Home seeks to shift the burden of the losses to 
Aetna, which came on the scene long after the occurrence of all 
pertinent events and without knowledge of any relevant facts. 
The points raised in Aetna's brief are alternative legal means 
to prevent Home's legal subterfuge and to arrive at a just 
result, giving effect to the jury's intention that Home Savings 
should bear the burden of its own business decisions. 
This appeal is necessary in order to correct 
fundamental errors made by the trial court in its refusal to 
enforce the terms of the parties' Standard Form 22 fidelity 
contract. In ruling as it did, the trial court condoned the 
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practice of postponing notice of dishonesty to the prejudice of 
a surety which is informed of the risks only after a new policy 
has been issued; it confused the consequences of employee 
dishonesty with the consequences of bad management; and it 
expanded the coverage of the insurance contract beyond its 
actual and intended terms. 
C. Rules for Interpretation of Bonds. 
In its responsive brief, Home Savings does not 
dispute the established rules of insurance contract 
enforcement. (See Appellants Brief at 27-29.) Instead, Home 
claims that the Bond contains ambiguous provisions and that 
ambiguity must be construed in favor of the insured. This 
general rule of construing ambiguous terms in favor of the 
insured does not apply in the present context for two reasons. 
First, Standard Form 22 is not ambiguous. Many courts have 
considered the Standard Form 22 and found it to be 
unambiguous. See, e.g., Sharp, 858 F.2d at 1044-46. 
Home identifies no ambiguities in the contract itself, and only 
implies ambiguity in the Bond application. The Application 
form was not ambiguous to the jury, which concluded from a 
layman's perspective that Home made misrepresentations about 
prior losses in the application process. (See Point III, 
below.) 
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Secondly, Home's argument implies that Standard 
Form 22 was the result of Aetna's unilateral drafting. To the 
contrary, Standard Form 22 is a product of arms' length 
negotiation between the Surety Association of America, an 
industry-wide collection of bonding carriers, and its 
counterpart, the U.S. League of Savings & Loan Associations, 
an industry-wide group of savings associations. See 
Affidavit of Frances X. LeMunyon at tab L of Aetna's Document 
Addendum. See also. Sharp, 858 F.2d at 1046. (The Sharp 
opinion is an excellent summary of the history and meaning of 
Standard Form 22.) As a result, the usual rule that ambiguity 
is construed against the drafter of a document is inappropriate 
in the context of Standard Form 22. 
If anything, the language of the Bond has suffered 
only at the hands of Home's strained and unusual reading. The 
jury gave the language of the Bond and the Application their 
"usual and natural meaning" and found, to the extent allowed, 
in favor of Aetna. See LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life 
Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858-59 (Utah 1988). It was the 
trial court, at the considerable urging of Home Savings, which 
ignored the "existing circumstances [and] the purpose of the 
policy," id., and which, through interpretation and blatant 
interpolation reached the wrong conclusion. "Ambiguity must 
appear on the bond or policy and cannot be read into it by a 
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strained interpretation in order to permit recovery." 35 
Am.Jur.2d, Fidelity Bonds and Insurance. § 3, p. 505 (1988). 
The special rules of interpretation do 
indeed apply only when there is an 
ambiguity; courts ought not to strain to 
find such ambiguities, if, in so doing, 
they defeat probable intentions of the 
parties. This is so even when the result 
is an apparently harsh consequence to the 
insured. 
Calcasieu-Marine National Bank v. American Employers' 
Insurance Co., 533 F.2d 290, 296 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 922, 97 S. Ct. 319, 50 L.Ed. 2d 289 (1976). 
POINT I 
SECTION 11 OF THE BOND PRECLUDES COVERAGE 
FOR LOSS FROM LARRY GLAD'S CONDUCT BECAUSE 
HOME SAVINGS LEARNED OF HIS DISHONESTY 
SEVEN MONTHS BEFORE THE BOND WAS PURCHASED. 
Introduction. 
Section 11 of Standard Form 22 provides that fidelity 
coverage for a given employee terminates immediately and 
automatically as soon as the insured employer learns that an 
employee is dishonest. Courts have repeatedly found that 
provisions identical or similar to Section 11 are valid, 
unambiguous, and enforceable. E.g., Alfalfa Electric 
Cooperative, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 376 F. Supp. 
901, 912 (W.D. Okla. 1973); Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co.. 426 F.2d 499, 500 (8th Cir. 1970), 
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Verneco, Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co,, 219 So. 2d 508, 510 
(La. 1969). 
This well understood provision is based on solid 
public policy. A surety insures for the actuarial risk that an 
unknown member of the general population of employees may be 
dishonest thereby causing a loss. However, once an employer 
learns of dishonesty by a specific employee, the risk is no 
longer based on actuarial possibilities. When the employer 
knows of an employee's predisposition to dishonesty, neither 
the surety nor the employer should expect further coverage for 
that employee unless the parties contract for special 
re-inclusion of that employee in the bond. Therefore, although 
there may have been initial coverage for Larry Glad under the 
F&D policy, there was no coverage by F&D for losses caused by 
Glad's conduct which occurred subsequent to Home's discovery of 
his dishonesty. Nor was there renewed coverage for Larry Glad 
under the Aetna Bond for any of Larry Glad's conduct because 
his known dishonesty was not disclosed to Aetna. 
A. The Correct Judicial Application of Section 11. 
Section 11 of Aetna's Bond precluded coverage from 
ever going into effect as to Larry Glad. Aetna, as a new 
bonding company, did not "assume liability for losses resulting 
from acts committed before the inception of [the bond] by an 
employee who was never within the coverage of the [bond]." 
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C. Douglas Wilson & Co, v. Insurance Co, of North America, 
590 F.2d 1275f 1279r n. 6. (4th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 
444 U.S. 831 (1979). As in Ritchie Grocer, supra., where 
the employee's dishonesty was discovered before he was hired, 
coverage under Aetna's policy never went into effect for Larry 
Glad. 
The courts which have considered employee dishonesty 
discovered before the effective date of a new Bond have 
universally held that coverage never goes into effect for the 
known dishonest employee. In St. Joe Paper Co. v. Hartford 
Accident and Indemnity Co., 359 F.2d 579, 580 (5th Cir. 1966), 
the Bond provided for cancellation "immediately upon discovery 
by the Insured . . . of any fraudulent or dishonest act on the 
part of such Employee." As in the present case, "[P]rior to 
the inception of these policies, St. Joe Paper Company came 
into the possession of both information and knowledge that 
Jones had committed a dishonesty which, under the recited terms 
of the policies, barred recovery." Id. at 583. 
Similarly, in Verneco, supra., the employee 
(Walden) was convicted of theft on November 2, 1960 and hired 
by the plaintiff companies with knowledge of that conviction in 
November 1961. Plaintiffs purchased a policy effective 
July 14, 1962 and discovered in December 1964 that Walden had 
been misappropriating funds and committing forgeries while in 
their employ. The court found that "no coverage ever obtained 
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insofar as Walden was concerned because the insured obtained 
knowledge of Walden's dishonest acts at least in November 1961 
prior to the inception date of the policy in July 1962." 219 
So, 2d at 510. 
An identical result was reached in Fidelity & 
Casualty Co. v. Central Bank of Houston. 672 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 
App. 1984), specifically in the context of a renewal bond. The 
court in that case held: "A renewal policy does not reinstate 
coverage for an employee that had already been terminated by a 
known dishonest act; it simply continues whatever coverage 
existed at the time of renewal." Id. at 647. 
B. The Error in Home Savings' Analysis. 
Home argues that Aetna's Bond covered Larry Glad 
because Section 11 voids coverage only for losses arising 
from actions subsequent to discovery of an employee's 
dishonesty ("subsequent losses"). This argument is only valid 
as to the F&D Bond, which was in place at the time the 
dishonesty and the likelihood of loss were discovered. Of 
course, F&D could not avoid losses incurred as a direct result 
of Glad's conduct which occurred before his dishonesty was 
discovered. However, F&D would not be responsible for losses 
caused by subsequent conduct if Home had elected to keep Larry 
Glad on the payroll after mid-December 1981. And Aetna, which 
only accepted an actuarial risk for the general employee 
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population, never accepted any risk for loss from Glad's 
misconduct. 
Home also argues that because Glad's dishonesty prior 
to Home's learning of such dishonesty "permeated" or affected 
34 of the 36 AFCO investor loans, coverage for the loss on 
those 34 loans was not terminated. This would be true if Aetna 
(instead of F&D) had provided coverage at the time of Home's 
discovery of Larry Glad's dishonesty. But it is not true where 
Aetna's coverage commenced more than seven months after the 
dishonesty was discovered and where Home already knew that 
losses on the AFCO investor loans would likely occur. 
The issue of whether Section 11 precludes coverage 
under a newly issued bond for both "prior losses," as well as 
"subsequent losses," was addressed in the leading case of 
C. Douglas Wilson & Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 
590 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir. 1979), cert, denied. 444 U.S. 831 
(1979). The pertinent facts in Wilson & Co. v. INA are 
almost identical to those in the present case. Wilson was a 
mortgage subsidiary of a bank holding company. On March 16, 
1973, Barksdale, then an employee and vice president of Wilson, 
was found to have falsely certified information on HUD forms 
regarding the dates and amounts of advances to loan customers. 
Wilson did not notify its fidelity bond insurer, St. Paul Fire 
& Marine, of Barksdale's actions. On March 25, 1973, INA and 
Hartford combined to issue new fidelity coverage for Wilson. 
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Hartford's and INA's contracts were "loss discovered" bonds, as 
was Aetna's herein. 
Five weeks after the first discovery of Barksdale's 
dishonesty, Wilson learned that earlier he had also falsely 
certified receipt of letters of credit required by the FHA to 
insure loans. Losses resulted and Wilson asserted fidelity 
claims against INA and Hartford. Both insurers denied coverage 
because of Wilson's knowledge of Barksdale's unrelated 
dishonesty on March 16, 1973, before the INA and Hartford 
fidelity bonds became effective. The court concluded that 
under the operation of the termination clauses of their 
policies coverage for Barksdale never went into effect. Id. 
at 1278. (The INA termination clause was identical to the 
Aetna Section 11 clause. Id., at 1277 n. 3, 1278.) 
Since we conclude that Barksdale's false 
certification of pre-advances constitutes 
dishonesty as a matter of law and that 
Wilson had knowledge of it before the 
inception of the INA and Hartford policies, 
and since Wilson concedes that it did not 
notify INA and Hartford of Barksdale's 
dishonesty, we sustain the conclusion of 
the district court that under the terms of 
their respective policies INA and Hartford 
cannot be held liable for Wilson's losses. 
Id. at 1279. Just as the Wilson court found as a matter of 
law that Barksdale's actions constituted dishonesty, the jury 
in the case at bar found that Home knew of Larry Glad's 
dishonesty in mid-December, 1981. (Jury Answer to Special 
Interrogatory No. 8.) 
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Judge Hoffman in the Wilson dissent argued, as does 
Home in the present case, that the termination clause was 
effective only as to "subsequent losses" and was not effective 
as to "prior losses." £ci. at 1290-91. However, the majority 
noted that this argument had validity only in the situation 
where the same insurer is at risk during the entire time at 
issue. So Home's argument would apply in this case only to 
F&D, but not to Aetna. The Wilson majority ruled that to 
hold INA and Hartford liable for loss from "acts committed 
before the inception of their respective policies by an 
employee who was never within the coverage of the policies 
[would be an] untenable result." Id. at 1279 n. 6. See 
also. St. Joe Paper Co. v. Hartford Ace. & Ind. Co., 359 
F.2d 579, 583 (5th Cir. 1966) (employer's knowledge of 
employee's dishonesty acquired before bond went into effect 
prevented coverage from ever going into effect under a policy 
provision virtually identical to Section 11.) 
In support of its position, Home reinterprets 
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Central Bank of 
Houston, 672 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App. 1984), which was cited by 
Aetna in its original brief in support of this Point I. Home 
claims that the court in F&C v. Central Bank "distinguished 
between dishonest acts occurring prior to discovery of 
dishonesty and those thereafter." (Home Savings' Brief at 
p. 54.) This is inaccurate, and it explains why Home finds the 
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case "confusing." The opinion in F&C v. Central Bank 
actually distinguished between losses occurring under a prior 
bond issued by the same company and those losses which 
occurred under the renewal bond in question. Id. at 650. 
Losses were distinguished prior to and after December 11, 1974, 
because that was the date the renewal bond was issued; 
contrary to Home's contention, that was not the date that 
Central Bank learned of employee De Lorenzo's dishonesty. 
Id. at 647, 650. In F&C v. Central Bank, the Texas 
Appellate Court correctly found that De Lorenzo was never 
within the coverage of the renewal bond, "because a renewal 
policy does not reinstate coverage for an employee that had 
already been terminated by a known dishonest act." Id. 
Conclusion: 
The same result should obtain here. The jury has 
established that Home Savings' management learned of Larry 
Glad's dishonesty seven months before management purchased the 
Aetna Bond. Although Home could have made a claim against F&D, 
it would be untenable to hold Aetna liable for losses 
attributable to Larry Glad, who had been terminated for his 
dishonesty seven months before Aetna ever issued its Bond. 
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POINT II 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNDER THE BOND 
BECAUSE HOME SAVINGS DISCOVERED ITS LOSS 
OUTSIDE THE AETNA BOND PERIOD. 
Introduction. 
There is no coverage under Aetna's contract of 
insurance because Home Savings "discovered" its loss on the 
AFCO investor loans during the period of F&D's bond. Under a 
discovery bond, the timing of actual monetary damage is not 
relevant to the determination of coverage. Coverage is 
determined by discovery, which is when the insured learns of 
facts which have or may subject the insured to an 
indemnifiable loss. Tr. Ex. 343, Rider 6091. E.g., First 
Natl. Bank of Bowie v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 
634 F.2d 1000, 1004 (5th Cir. 1981). Accord: First Natl. 
Bank of Fleming v. Maryland Casualty Co.. 581 P.2d 744, 745 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1978). 
A. Trial Court's Error. 
The trial court misapplied the discovery standard by 
inventing the phrase "discovery of loss sustained." The 
bond contract contains no such language. The trial court's 
error is apparent on the face of its August 25, 1987 Order and 
Minute Entry: 
For purposes of this motion, the court 
assumes the evidence establishes as a 
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matter of law that dishonesty of 
plaintiff's employee, Larry Glad, was known 
before the policy period commenced on 
June 21, 1982. This discovery of the 
dishonesty, however, is not discovery of a 
loss sustained. It is not the dishonesty 
which is insured, but the loss sustained 
thereby. There is no evidence that there 
was any loss sustained prior to the 
judgment in or settlement of the Armitaae 
case. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
Report (Def. App. 0), dated June 4, 1982, 
itself indicates that plaintiff Home 
Savings was subjected only to "possible 
losses." A loss cannot be discovered 
until sustained; since the latter occurred 
during the policy period, the discovery 
thereof could not have occurred earlier. 
Order and Minute Entry at pp. 1-2, R. at 74-79.1 (emphasis 
added.) 
Once the trial court equated loss with "damages" and 
found no damage until the period of Aetna's coverage, the 
outcome was predetermined and the substance of the bond — what 
it covers — was eviscerated. The Bond covers a loss 
"discovered" during the bond period. It does not cover "loss 
sustained" during the period of coverage. To the contrary, it 
expressly provides that the actual monetary damages can be 
"sustained at any time," and it presumes that damages probably 
will occur at a different time from discovery. 
Discovery occurs when the insured becomes 
aware of facts which would cause a 
reasonable person to assume that a loss 
covered by the bond has been or will be 
incurred even though the exact amount or 
details of loss may not be then known. 
Notice to the insured of an actual or 
potential claim by a third party which 
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alleges that the insured is liable under 
circumstances, which, if true, would 
create a loss under this bond constitutes 
such discovery. 
Rider 6091 (emphasis added). 
The idea that "a loss cannot be discovered until 
sustained" is contrary to public policy and common sense. If 
that were the law, fidelity coverage for financial institutions 
could only be obtained by deception or by paying unconscionable 
premiums. Any time an insurer became aware of a potential loss 
from pending litigation which would not be resolved until after 
the renewal date, the surety would avoid coverage by simply 
refusing to renew the policy. The insured could then obtain 
coverage only by concealing the potential loss from a new 
carrier, or by paying the existing insurer a revised premium 
equal to the expected damages. Such a consequence thwarts the 
purpose of insurance and is contrary to public policy. 
B* The Language of Standard Form 22. 
Home seeks to circumvent the Bond's discovery 
standard by confining its operation to "notice" under 
Section 4. This is improper. The Bond's preamble is explicit 
with regard to the general applicability of the contract's 
Conditions and Limitations, of which Section 4 is a key 
provision. The preamble reads as follows: 
The Underwriter, in consideration of an 
agreed premium, and subject to the 
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Declarations made a part hereof, the 
General Agreements, Conditions and 
Limitations and other terms of this Bond, 
agrees with the insured, in accordance with 
the Insuring Agreements 
hereof . . . with respect to loss 
sustained by the Insured at any time but 
discovered during the Bond Period, to 
indemnify and hold harmless the Insured. 
(Emphasis added.) The Bond reiterates the incorporation and 
general applicability of all provisions at the top of page 4, 
which reads: 
THE FOREGOING INSURING AGREEMENTS AND 
GENERAL AGREEMENTS ARE SUBJECT TO THE 
FOLLOWING CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS. 
In addition, the title of Section 4 is "LOSS - NOTICE - PROOF -
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS." Of course, Section 4 is augmented by the 
objective and per se definitions of discovery contained in 
Rider 6091. Thus, by its title, by its explicit terms, and by 
the Bond's internal references of applicability, discovery of 
employee dishonesty pertains to both procedural (i.e., notice) 
and substantive (i.e., coverage) aspects of the contract. 
The cases are consistent with this policy language: 
The discovery provision in question [the 
objective and per se definitions found 
in Rider 6091] is found in section four of 
the bond which is entitled "Conditions and 
Limitations." The definition of discovery 
clearly acts as a limitation on coverage, 
as the bond only applies to losses 
"discovered by the Insured during the bond 
period." 
Home Life Insurance Co. v. Clay, 13 Kan. App. 2d 435, 773 
P.2d 666, 677 (1989) (emphasis added). See also, Roval 
-19-
Trust Bank v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 788 F.2d 719 
(11th Cir. 1986) (rejection of bank's argument that the 
Section 4 discovery definition applied only to notice, but not 
to determination of coverage.) The Bond only makes internal 
sense, and it only meshes logically and correctly with prior 
and subsequent fidelity policies, if discovery of loss is given 
the one established meaning which is addressed in the case law 
and defined in Rider 6091. See, e.g., Central Progressive 
Bank v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 658 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1981). 
Home's attempt to give the term two distinct meanings 
in the same document is an exercise in obfuscation. 
Insurance policies, as other contracts, 
must be construed as a whole. The meaning 
of a contract should always be ascertained 
by a consideration of all the pertinent 
provisions and never be determined by 
critical analysis of a single or isolated 
provision. 
Home Life Ins. Co. v. Clay, 13 Kan. App. 2d 435, 773 P.2d 
666, 676 (1989) (citations omitted). 
C. Timing of Insured's Actual Loss or Damages is not 
Relevant. 
In its Brief, Home argues for nine and one-half pages 
(see Home's Point I at pp. 35-44) that it could not have 
discovered its loss prior to the period of Aetna's Bond because 
it had not "sustained" such a loss until the Armitage verdict 
was entered against it. No legal authority is cited in support 
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of this proposition. The cases are all to the contrary — the 
timing of the actual monetary loss is not relevant to the issue 
of coverage under a "discovery" bond. E.g., First National 
Bank of Fleming v. Maryland Casualty, 581 P.2d at 745; FNB 
Bowie v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 634 F.2d at 
1004. 
Home's policy argument on this point is a red 
herring. Home contends that if one standard for discovery of 
loss determines both notice and coverage, then in order for the 
insured to act properly, it would be required to simultaneously 
defend against charges of fraud in third party lawsuits while 
admitting employee fraud in its notice to its insurer. This is 
a makeweight argument. A third party complaint constitutes 
discovery per se under the Rider 6091 definition. FNB 
Bowie v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N.Y., 634 F.2d at 1004. 
Notice of such discovery need only entail a description or 
identification of the complaint, much as Home finally provided 
to Aetna in its December 1982 letter (Tr. Ex. 140) . This would 
be a far different case if Home Savings, like the insured in 
FNB Bowie, had simply acted reasonably and prudently by 
providing F&D with letters and complaints as they were received 
in February, March, April, and May 1982. 
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D. Home Savings' Discovery of Loss as a Matter of Lav. 
Home finally argues that there was no undisputed 
determination by the trial court that Home actually 
discovered the loss — as the term is correctly defined and 
applied — prior to the Bond's period of coverage. This is 
simply not true. The trial court held: "For purposes of this 
motion, the court assumes the evidence establishes as a matter 
of law that the dishonesty of plaintiff's employee, Larry Glad, 
[which resulted in Home's loss] was known before the policy 
period commenced on June 21, 1982." At the time of the motion, 
Aetna had presented the trial court with a wealth of facts to 
establish that prior to June 21, 1982, Home Savings was aware 
of information that would lead any reasonable person to 
conclude that a loss was imminent. 
Those facts fall into the following categories: 
1. Home's knowledge in December 1981 of the 
$15,000 kickback received by Larry Glad from AFCO for 
the handling of the AFCO investor loans. 
2. Extensive information about the financial 
difficulties of the AFCO businesses. 
3. Letters from Grant Affleck and attorneys for 
investors addressing irregularities and alleging 
fraud in the AFCO investor loans. 
4. Three lawsuits (one of which was the 
predecessor of the Armitaae v. Home Savings case) 
alleging fraud and extensive irregularities in the 
AFCO investor loans by Home Savings and its 
employees, Larry Glad and William Cox. 
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5. Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") 
examination reports highlighting irregularities in 
the AFCO investor loans and documenting existing 
losses. 
(R. at 200-200.20.) The facts were substantiated by a 170 page 
Appendix containing 15 uncontested exhibits, most of which 
became trial exhibits. (Cf., Appendix, R. at 2928-3098, with 
Tr. Exs. 343, 13, 81, 111, 20, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, and 
190.) In its response to Aetna's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Home Savings admitted (R. at 257), or simply did not respond to 
most of the facts. The only one of Aetna's twenty-three 
factual statements that Home contested was the timing of its 
receipt of a credit report on the AFCO businesses. 
Five of the factual statements from Aetna's Summary 
Judgment Motion were incorporated into the Stipulated Pretrial 
Order's section of Uncontroverted Facts. These were 
paragraph 6: the existence and Home's knowledge of Glad's AFCO 
kickback; paragraph 9: knowledge of AFCO bankruptcy; and 
paragraph 11: the existence and knowledge of the Bott, 
Alcorn, and Clifford Complaints. All of the factual 
statements in support of Aetna's Motion for Summary Judgment 
were proven at trial. See Aetna's Appellate Brief at 
Statement of Facts, para. 2.a-n; pp. 9-14. Now, in its 
responsive Brief, Home contests only the date when it received 
the FHLBB Examination Report (Tr. Ex. 196), but not the content 
-23-
nor the fact that the date on the Report predates the purchase 
of the Aetna Bond. 
As shown, there was overwhelming evidence to 
conclude, as the trial court did, that "as a matter of law the 
dishonesty of plaintiff's employee, Larry Glad, was known 
before the policy period commenced on June 21, 1982." (R. at 
344.) This evidence not only operated to terminate coverage 
for Larry Glad under Section 11 (see Point I, above), but also 
constituted discovery of loss by both the objective and 
per se standards of Rider 6091. The trial court's error 
was in limiting its evidentiary conclusion to the notice issue, 
instead of applying it also to the ultimate issue of coverage. 
Conclusion. 
Discovery of loss sufficient to activate the 
Section 4 notice requirement also determines whether 
coverage falls under an existing, prior, or subsequent bond. 
Under this state of the law, it is inconceivable that Home 
Savings can have coverage under Aetna's contract for damages 
resulting from the Armitacre case, which was commenced in 
April 1982, during the period of F&D's coverage. In FNB 
Bowie, a single letter from an attorney for a third party was 
sufficient to establish per se discovery of loss. It made 
no difference that the allegations were then unproven or that 
the bank did not believe them. 
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The trial court was correct to conclude as a matter 
of law that Home had "discovered" Larry Glad's dishonesty (and 
its own loss) during the period of F&D's policy, not Aetna's. 
But the Court of Appeals should correct the trial court's 
misapplication of that finding by now entering judgment in 
favor of Aetna. 
POINT III 
THE JURY'S RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 
2 AND 4 REGARDING HOME'S MISREPRESENTATIONS IN THE 
APPLICATION PROCESS MANDATE A VOIDING OF THE BOND. 
Introduction. 
Home's response to this Point III confuses the 
alternative grounds on which Aetna prevailed on this issue 
at trial, before the trial court set aside the jury's findings 
on Special Interrogatories 2 and 4. A brief overview will help 
refocus the legal analysis and the marshalling of evidence. 
The relevant statute, U.C.A. § 31-19-8(1) (1974), 
deals with affirmative or written insurance applications. It 
has three separate, independent standards for negation of 
coverage. (See discussion at Point III.B. of Aetna's initial 
brief, pp. 48-52.) The first statutory standard, involving 
"fraudulent" statements, is not involved here. U.C.A. 
§ 31-19-8(1)(a). The second statutory standard, involving 
misstatements which are material to the insurer's acceptance of 
the risk or hazard, is an objective test of materiality. Id. 
-25-
at § 8(1)(b). The third statutory standard, involving what a 
particular insurer would have done if it had known the true 
facts, is a subjective test in the nature of detrimental 
reliance. Id. at § 8(1)(c). These standards were stated in 
the disjunctive so that any one of them could negate coverage. 
Hardv v. Prudential Ins. Co.. 763 P.2d 761, 766 (Utah 1988). 
Special Interrogatory No. 2, as written by the court, 
combined in the conjunctive both the second and third statutory 
standards. In its answer to Special Interrogatory No. 2, the 
jury had to find both objective material misrepresentations on 
the Bond Application form (Tr. Ex. 122), as well as subjective, 
detrimental reliance by Aetna on those misstatements in order 
to answer the question as it did. Despite this unnecessarily 
high hurdle, the jury found misrepresentations under both 
standards. The trial court's failure to distinguish these 
separate, independent standards is apparent in its post-trial 
analysis of the subjective evidence (largely the Don Bradshaw 
and David Robinson testimony) to conclude that there was 
insufficient evidence for the jury to find that an objectively 
material misrepresentation had occurred. 
Because the trial court's error was the starting 
point for this Point III analysis, in its original Brief Aetna 
reviewed primarily the sufficiency of the subjective evidence. 
(See Point III. A. at pp. 45-48.) However, the initial focus 
on evidence relating to the subjective statutory standard 
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should not obscure the significant, independent evidence of 
objective, material misrepresentations by Home. The evidence 
of those misrepresentations is reviewed in greater detail in 
this Point III at A, below. 
Special Interrogatory No. 4 addressed an entirely 
separate common law duty to disclose material information, even 
if it is not asked for in the application process. This duty 
arises, in part, from the special nature of coverage. The 
common law duty to disclose is also based on an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing which exists in all 
contracts. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 798 
(Utah 1985). Because an insured cannot improve its coverage of 
existing circumstances by simply changing policies or insurers, 
it has a duty to disclose to a new insurer all facts which are 
material to coverage under an existing Bond. Analysis under 
the common law standard is similar to the concept of 
unilateral mistake of fact in standard contract formation law 
where a contract is void if the non-disclosing party knows or 
has reason to know that the mistaken party would consider the 
fact material, if it were disclosed. Kiahtipes v. Mills. 649 
P.2d 9, 13 (Utah 1982). 
Of course, Aetna prevailed on the common law standard 
as well. The trial court's decision to disregard the jury's 
answer on Special Interrogatory No. 4 was based on a legal 
conclusion that no duty existed to disclose information outside 
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the written application process. This ruling ignores the 
current law which recognizes the continuing importance and 
vitality of common law contract principles in the context of 
insurance policy formation. 
A. Home's Material Misrepresentations on the Bond 
Application; U.C.A. S 31-19-8(1)(b). 
Contrary to Home's contention, the material facts 
which Home misrepresented in the Application really came into 
evidence throughout the whole course of trial. For 
instance, Question 17 of the Application (Tr. Ex. 122) 
inquired: 
List on page 4 all losses sustained by 
date, type and amount, whether reimbursed 
or not, during the last six years. If 
none, so state: 
Home responded: "None over deductible amount [$5,000]." On 
page 4 of the Application, where Home should have listed 
information pertaining to losses on the AFCO investor loans 
under the heading, "Amount of loss pending," Home made no 
entry. 
Home Savings also indicated in response to Question 
13(c), that the date of its last examination by state or 
federal regulatory agencies was "June 1982." In that very 
Report for "Examination as of June 4, 1982," (Tr. Ex. 196), the 
FHLBB noted that Home Savings was already booking losses 
pertaining to the AFCO investor loans. Under the heading, 
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"Affect on Operations," the examiners stated that "management 
had established an $85,000 reserve for uncollected interest on 
the loans . . . . The operating loss through May 31 was 
$67,402 . . . ." (Id. at 2.2) (emphasis added). The 
examiners also wrote that "Hone of the borrowers are making 
payments, the loans are scheduled items [read: high risk of 
loss] and the institution has commenced foreclosure." (Tr. 
Ex. 196 at 2.) The examiners further noted the existing 
lawsuits by AFCO investors against Home Savings, the nature of 
the claims made in those lawsuits, and that rescission of the 
AFCO investor loans was a remedy sought. In summary, the FHLBB 
said that "by deviating from normal loan processing procedures, 
management has subjected the institution to high scheduled 
items ratios, lawsuits and possible losses." (Id. at p 2.1.) 
At trial, the jury also heard direct evidence of Home's 
knowledge of the AFCO investor lawsuits and attorney letters. 
In addition to the foregoing omissions and 
misrepresentations, Question 15(c) of the Application asked: 
Is there a formal, planned program 
requiring segregation of duties so that no 
single transaction can be fully controlled 
(from origination to posting) by one person? 
Home Savings answered "yes" to this question. However, Home 
Savings contended throughout trial that its losses resulted 
from Larry Glad having control over multiple facets of the 
subject loans, from origination to closing. (See, e.g., 
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Statement of Facts in Home's responsive Brief, paras. 30, 42, 
43, 46-52.) 
A misrepresentation is material "if reasonable 
insurers would regard the fact as one which substantially 
increases the chance that the risk insured against will happen 
and therefore would reject the application." Hardy v. 
Prudential Ins. Co.. supra, 763 P.2d 769, 770 (Utah 1988). 
The magnitude of the evidence, Home maintains that it answered 
the Application correctly and without omissions. The jury 
concluded to the contrary. The trial court distorted its 
analysis in deciding to reject the jury's finding, considering 
only the subjective issue of what Aetna would have done if it 
had known the true information, but ignoring the jury's 
separate finding of objective materiality. Home has therefore 
failed to meet its burden to prove insufficient evidence in 
order to have the trial court's rejection of the jury finding 
sustained on appeal. State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
B. Aetna's Subjective Reliance on Home's Application Form 
Misrepresentations on the Application (U.C.A. SS 31-19 -
8(l)fc)). 
In addition to the wealth of objective evidence 
presented to the jury, Aetna also offered testimony from the 
bond agent, Don Bradshaw, and from Aetna's bond underwriter, 
David Robinson, as to the effect of such misrepresentations on 
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Aetna's willingness to enter into a contract in light of such 
risks. (See Appellant's Brief, Point III, at 46-48.) Such 
direct testimony was not necessary to support a jury finding on 
this point, because the jury could have drawn the inference 
from the seriousness of the misrepresentations that no surety 
would have written a bond for such risks under those 
circumstances. Nevertheless, the court permitted the testimony 
and the jury used it to support their finding. The trial court 
then improperly set aside this jury finding, because it later 
decided the supporting testimony was improper. The jury's 
determination should be reinstated and judgment in Aetna's 
favor entered accordingly. 
C. Home Had a Duty to Volunteer Information Material to the 
Risk Insured. 
A common law duty of voluntary disclosure was 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Stipcich v. 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 277 U.S. 311, 316 (1928). 
Insurance policies are traditionally 
contracts uberrimae fidei and a failure 
by the insured to disclose conditions 
affecting the risk, of which he is aware, 
makes the contract voidable at the 
insurer's option. 
Concededly the modern practice of requiring 
the applicant for life insurance to answer 
questions prepared by the insurer has 
relaxed this rule to some extent, since 
information not asked for is presumably 
deemed immaterial. 
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(Citations omitted, emphasis added.) The Stipcich rule was 
applied more recently in Collins v. Pioneer Title Ins. Co., 
629 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1980). The Sixth Circuit there held 
that the insured's duty to make a fair disclosure of the facts 
means that it must disclose information which is material to 
the risk involved. Id. at 434 (cites omitted). "Whether 
information not disclosed is material is a question of law for 
the court." Id. (Citations omitted.) 
As shown in Point III.C. of Appellant's Brief 
(pp. 52-54), Home Savings clearly failed to disclose such 
material facts about the AFCO investor loan problems and Larry 
Glad's involvement in them. The jury determined unequivocally 
in its answer to Special Interrogatory No. 4 that the 
information was both material and omitted. The common law 
standard should be recognized and upheld, and the jury's 
determination should be implemented through a reversal in 
Aetna's favor. 
D. The Issue Was Properly Preserved for Trial and is Ripe 
for Appellate Review. 
In an effort to circumvent the effect of its 
misrepresentations in the Bond application process, Home 
contends that the misrepresentation issues were only raised 
late in the trial. This is not true. Aetna first addressed 
these issues in the 12th and 13th defenses of its Answer. (R. 
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at 31-32.) Although there was some discussion at one point 
about waiving those defenses, the defenses were promptly 
reinstated and were made part of the Pretrial Order (R. at 738) 
where they were addressed in four different places. In 
addition to the court's specific order that they could be 
reasserted (id.), Aetna listed misrepresentation as one of 
its claims in this case (R. at 722), misrepresentation as a 
question of fact for the jury (R. at 730), and the duty to 
volunteer information in the application as a question of law 
(R. at 732). 
Not only was this issue discussed in pretrial 
motions, but it was also discussed at great length when Don 
Bradshaw, the bond agent, first testified at trial on 
November 6, 1987. During cross-examination, Aetna's counsel 
attempted to inquire about the Application form. (Tr. 
Ex. 122.) The trial court took a proffer of evidence outside 
the hearing of the jury because it viewed the application issue 
as a question of law. (R. 2906.41.) In its proffer, Aetna 
examined Mr. Bradshaw about the Application form and 
specifically about Question No. 17. (R. 2906.41-51.) During 
part of that examination, a quotation from Mr. Bradshaw's 
deposition was published, in which he stated: 
If a prospective client has any knowledge 
of a loss, he should disclose it in that 
application whether it is a possible loss 
or a factual loss. 
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(R. 2906*46.) The trial court refused Aetna's request to ask 
Mr. Bradshaw, in the hearing of the jury, if the Application 
called for any loss information generally. (R. 2906.50.) 
However, further evidence regarding the Application form was 
elicited from both Mr. Bradshaw and from Aetna's 
representative, David Robinson, later in the case. (R. at 
2916.11, .20-23, .51-52.) The jury heard that testimony and 
made a common sense determination of what should have been 
disclosed in the Application. 
Based on the trial evidence, the jury concluded that 
Home Savings' responses constituted material misrepresentations 
and that those misrepresentations were subjectively critical 
to Aetna's decision to issue the Bond. Furthermore, the jury 
concluded that, given the nature and form of the inquiries in 
the application process, Home Savings should have volunteered 
pertinent information about potential losses to Aetna. The 
issues were tried on the evidence and decided by the jury. The 
result should be sustained in Aetna's favor over the 
machinations of Home Savings and the mistakes of the trial 
court. 
E. Aetna May Rescind Coverage with Respect to Larry Glad 
Only or it May Rescind the Entire Bond. 
In Special Jury Interrogatory No. 2, the jury decided 
that if Aetna had known the facts misrepresented or not 
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disclosed by Home, "it would not have issued the bond or 
would have excluded the risk disclosed." Home never disclosed 
risks related to the dishonesty of Larry Glad. Therefore, the 
bond was void ab initio with respect to Larry Glad, because 
"the provision in each bond relating to discovery of employee 
dishonesty does not cause a forfeiture of the entire bond . . . 
[R]ather, this provision simply provides that the blanket 
coverage of the bond does not extend to employees of the 
insured who are known by the insured to be dishonest." C. 
Douglas Wilson & Co. v. Insurance Co. of N.Am., 464 F. Supp. 
1, 17 (D.S.C. 1977), aff'd.. 590 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir. 1979), 
cert, denied 444 U.S. 831 1929. 
As stated in the Introduction, Aetna contracted to 
provide fidelity coverage to Home only as to the generic 
employee population. Therefore, Aetna may rescind coverage for 
the risk it would have excluded had it been informed of Larry 
Glad's specific dishonesty; and it can do so without a refund 
because no premium was ever received for that risk. Since 
"there was never any coverage as to [Larry Glad], there was 
never anything which could be forfeited." Id. 
Aetna may also rescind the entire bond because of 
misrepresentation and non-disclosure. The general rule is 
that a "return of the premium is not essential to the avoidance 
of a policy, nor is its retention a waiver, especially . . . 
where knowledge of the ground of avoidance is first obtained 
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after a loss." 44 Am. Jur. 2d § 1646. The several cases cited 
by Home in support of its theory that Aetna has waived its 
right to rescind the policy are inapposite because in every 
instance the insurer performed some affirmative act which 
ratified the existence of the policy after having discovered 
grounds for rescission. For instance, in Dairyland Ins. Co. 
v. Kammerer, 327 N.W.2d 618, 619 (Neb. 1982), the insurer was 
deemed to have ratified the policy by giving notice of 
cancellation of the coverage on a date after its discovery of 
grounds for rescission, and by retaining the premium through 
the date of cancellation. In Perry v. Woodall, 438 P.2d 813, 
814 (Utah 1968), a purchaser of a business attempted to 
renegotiate the purchase price while continuing to operate the 
business after he had discovered grounds for rescinding the 
contract. In that case, the court held that he waited too long 
to attempt to rescind. Id. at 815. In Verex Assurance, Inc. 
v. J. Hanson Sav. & Loan, 816 F. 2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1987,) the 
insurer was deemed to have waived its right to rescind because 
it accepted premiums after receiving notice of a reason to 
rescind. See also. Farrinaton v. Granite State Fire Ins. 
Co. of Portsmouth, 232 P.2d 754 (Utah 1951). By contrast, in 
this case no act of Aetna was inconsistent with rescission of 
coverage for losses from the AFCO investor loans, and so 
coverage should not be created by an imputed waiver. 
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The doctrine of reliance also validates rescission 
without immediate refund of premium. An excellent example is 
Robertson v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Arkansas, Inc.. 
668 F. Supp. 1259, 1261 (W.D. Ark. 1987), where the court held 
that the insured could not invoke the doctrine of estoppel 
against an insurer in the absence of any proof that the insured 
changed his position for the worse in reliance on the insurer's 
failure to refund a premium. Similarly, in Pi Santo v. 
Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 489 F.Supp. 1352, 1360 (E.D. Pa. 
1980), the insurer was not estopped from denying coverage on 
the ground of failure to return the unearned portion of the 
premiums until three and one-half years after accident. 
Home has not introduced any facts to show that Aetna 
ratified the Bond after discovering grounds for rescission 
either by collecting further premiums or by attempting to 
cancel the Bond. Nor can Home show that it relied on Aetna's 
coverage to its detriment, especially where it failed to 
disclose material facts and could have made a claim for 
coverage under the existing F&D bond when it became aware of 
those facts. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRADING EXCLUSION VOIDS 
COVERAGE UNDER THE BOND FOR LOSSES ON 
THE AFCO INVESTOR LOANS. 
Introduction. 
Home Savings agrees with Aetna that the purpose of 
the Bond's trading exclusion (Rider 6030a) is to omit from 
coverage the type of risk associated with securities 
transactions. (Home Savings' Brief at p. 79.) Therefore, 
the question for appeal is whether the losses in this case 
arose out of trading in securities and whether that issue has 
been properly preserved for review by the Court of Appeals. 
A. Trial Court Made Improper Legal Interpretation and 
Application of Rider 6030a. 
Aetna's appeal on this issue is from the trial 
court's ruling in denying Aetna's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the trading exclusion. The trial court did not give the 
trading exclusion rider its full, intended operation in 
light of the Armitage judgment. Home Savings calls the trial 
court's decision at summary judgment an "analytical opinion." 
But a careful reading proves exactly the opposite. Without 
legal support or policy analysis, the trial court essentially 
stated the same tautology repeatedly: 
The nature of the evidence, jury 
instructions, and verdict in Armitage 
necessarily requires the nomenclature 
"involved in the sale or exchange of 
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securities" to characterize Home's conduct 
and the jury's findings. Such 
"involvement," however, does not 
necessarily equate to "trading" in 
securities as that term is used in 
Rider SR6030a. 
Facilitation of a sale may constitute a 
sale under various securities statutes, but 
it does not necessarily constitute trading 
in securities as that term is used in 
Rider 6030a. 
[A]n inherent finding of the prescribed 
acts "in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security" . . is not 
necessarily the equivalent of the finding 
that Home traded securities. 
(R. at 329-330.) 
The trial court erred in this ruling. Securities 
coverage was expressly culled out of Standard Form No. 22 
because of the special risks inherent in that type of 
activity. Shearson/American Express v. First Continental Bank 
& Trust Co., 579 F.Supp. 1305 (W.D. Mo. 1984). That being the 
case, it was not the intention of the parties or the purpose of 
the Bond to cover losses resulting from a jury verdict of 
direct and secondary liability for securities law violations. 
As Home Savings acknowledges, the relevant securities 
in the Armitaae case were the promissory notes and trust 
deeds between AFCO and its investors. (See Armitaae Jury 
Instruction No. 5.03, R. at 210.48.) It was in the context of 
trading in these securities that Home Savings was held liable 
in the Armitaae case. Home was not held liable because it 
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was a lender to the AFCO investors, but because of its direct 
involvement with and support of Grant Affleck in the sale of 
the AFCO securities. 
Contrary to Home's argument, the AFCO investor 
lending activity was unprecedented. Home Savings had only done 
5 or 10 second mortgage loans for insiders prior to the AFCO 
investor loans commencing in November 1981. (William H. Cox 
Testimony, R. at 2914.96, 2905.34-.35.) In addition, Home had 
never used an outside loan broker such as Grant Affleck to 
solicit loans and process loan applications in the volume and 
with the pre-qualification commitments involved in this case. 
Fred Smolka testimony at R. at 2917.154, .160-.161, .179.) 
Trial Exhibits 8, 9, 10, 11, 89, and 90 document the 
negotiations of Home's management and its agreements with 
Affleck. In the Armitage lawsuit, Home was held liable for 
aiding and abetting Grant Affleck, not Larry Glad, and for 
controlling Affleck in the context of security violations. 
Under these circumstances, there is no justification 
for the restrictive application which the trial court gave to 
the trading exclusion. The proper approach is demonstrated in 
Sutro Bros. & Co. v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North 
America, 264 F.Supp. 273 (S.D. N.Y. 1967). In that case, 
coverage for a securities broker was denied under a trading 
exclusion when the broker's agent accepted uncertified funds in 
exchange for delivery of securities. The Federal District 
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Court there held that the loss was necessarily sustained 
directly or indirectly from trading and was therefore not 
covered by the fidelity provisions of the bond. Id. at 289. 
Coverage was excluded even though the loss was immediately 
caused by a bad check [here, rescinded second mortgage loans to 
the AFCO investors], because the loss occurred in the context 
of securities trading. 
B. The Issue was Properly Presented to the Trial Court and 
Preserved for Appeal. 
In response to Aetna's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the trial court ruled as a matter of law that none of Home's 
various securities violations "necessarily equate to 'trading' 
in securities as that term is used in Rider SR6030a." (R. at 
329.) The trial court's Minute Entry was not a "final 
judgment" subject to immediate appeal. Rule 54(b), Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, the decision became the law 
of the case for purposes of trial, and it is now appealable. 
Even after summary judgment, the issue of the trading 
exclusion was addressed, to a limited extent, in the actual 
trial. (See; "Defendant's Claims" and "Contested Issues of 
Fact" in the Stipulated Pretrial Order, R. at 722 and 730; Tr. 
Exs. 113-115, 196, 330, 356, and 357-360; Aetna's closing 
arguments, R. at 2917.180 - .226; and Aetna's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict, R. at 1364-1368.) However, Aetna did not attempt 
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to present the issue directly to the jury because the trial 
court's ruling had eviscerated any factual issue. After having 
raised the issue in summary judgment and receiving an adverse 
legal ruling, it was not necessary for Aetna to browbeat the 
court with constant repetition of its claims. The trial court 
was aware throughout the proceedings that Aetna vehemently 
disagreed with several of its rulings on summary judgment 
issues (see, e.g., R. at 2923.224-.226.). A party does not 
lose appellate rights on such fundamental matters by refusing 
to be obstreperous at the trial level. 
Conclusion. 
Home Savings7 argument that the loan to AFCO 
investors was its usual and ordinary course of business, and 
therefore not trading in securities, is intriguing in light of 
this unique chapter in Utah's history. The nature and reach of 
the AFCO scheme throughout the Utah financial community was 
unparalleled. Criminal and civil convictions for security law 
violations in a series of uniform loan transactions by a number 
of different lenders made to borrowers who were brought in bulk 
to lending institutions by an outside broker is without 
precedent. It is exactly this unique and novel type of risk 
for which the trading exclusion, Rider 6030a, was designed. 
The Court of Appeals should make a proper legal interpretation 
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of that key part of the contract of insurance and reverse the 
trial court's summary judgment ruling. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE JURY 
TO CONSIDER HOME'S BAD BUSINESS JUDGMENT AND 
MISMANAGEMENT AS CAUSES OF THE AFCO INVESTOR LOSSES. 
Introduction. 
The Aetna Bond contained a causation requirement 
imposing liability on Aetna only for "loss resulting directly 
from one or more dishonest or fraudulent acts of an 
Employee." Tr. Ex. 343, Rider 6041. However, the jury made 
a finding of causation in Home's favor only because the 
combination of jury instructions and the Special Verdict form 
prevented consideration of whether the conduct of Home Savings' 
management constituted a separate and superseding cause of its 
loss. The record is filled with evidence that Home's officers 
and directors initiated and were actively involved in the AFCO 
loan program. (See, e.g., testimony of William H. Cox at 
Tab O of Aetna's Document Appendix.) However, the trial court 
refused to allow the jury to consider whether management's 
conduct constituted an alternate or superseding cause of the 
losses. 
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A. Home#s Losses Were Caused by its Own Management 
Decisions, 
The Armitage v. Home Savings case focused on Home's 
primary and secondary liability for fraud in the sale or 
exchange of AFCO securities. The Armitage case was not the 
only suit involving AFCO investors; sixteen other financial 
institutions (none of which employed Larry Glad) also made such 
loans and experienced similar results. Home's line of credit 
to AFCO and its authorization to make up to $3 million in 
second mortgage loans to AFCO investors were both approved by 
Home's management and the Board of Directors, independent of 
Larry Glad. After Larry Glad was terminated, Home continued to 
process and complete loans to AFCO investors. Although it was 
alleged that Glad falsified information which resulted in loans 
to unqualified borrowers, the Armitage court imposed 
liability on Home because the nature of the transactions 
mandated a rescission of the loans. Home, like many of Utah's 
other lending institutions, would have suffered a loss on the 
AFCO investor loans even if Larry Glad were found to have been 
completely honest. Therefore, management's conduct was the one 
effective cause, and the superseding cause of the losses. 
The trial court denied Aetna the opportunity to have 
the jury consider any cause for Home's losses other than the 
conduct of Larry Glad. Under the rule that the law will not 
permit one to profit from his own wrong, an insured under a 
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fidelity bond cannot recover if he has "knowledge of, or has 
countenanced, has acquiesced in or participated in the wrongful 
acts of his employees." Home Indemnity Co. v. Reynolds & 
Co., 187 N.E.2d 274, 283 (111. App. 1963) (citation omitted). 
If a corporation itself is "party to the acts complained of, 
there can be no recovery . . . . A policy of fidelity insurance 
does not insure an employer against his own fraud." Levey v. 
Jamison, 82 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir. 1936) (citations 
omitted). The jury, in its common wisdom, knew what was right: 
"the participation of high level officers of the Bank in a 
course of action determined at a high level to be in the best 
interests of the Bank prevents the Bank from obtaining 
indemnity . . . under the fidelity7 provisions of the bond." 
State Street Bank v. U.S.F.&G., 539 N.E.2d 779, 781 (111. 
App. 4 Dist. 1989). Aetna tried to have the jury decide 
whether the direct participation of Home's management in the 
AFCO investor loans constituted a separate and superseding 
cause of the loss. However, even though the trial court 
allowed the jury to hear a great deal of evidence regarding 
management's misconduct, it prevented the jury from considering 
management's role in the fiasco. 
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B. Aetna Properly Preserved the Jury Instruction and Special 
Verdict for Review on Appeal, 
The required specificity in objection to a jury 
instruction is whether the trial court understands the 
nature of the objection and can make timely corrections. 
Employees Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Allen Oil Co., 
258 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah 1953). If an objection is made in 
conference, there is no requirement that it be exhaustively 
repeated in open court in order to preserve it for appellate 
review. Watters v, Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1981) 
(compliance with Rule 51 where court was aware of objection to 
absence of jury instructions as a result of conference with 
counsel); Pagan v. Thrift City, Inc.. 460 P.2d 832, 833-34 
(Utah 1969) (trial court conference with counsel to discuss 
jury instructions found to be appropriate time to object.) 
At this late date, the suggestion by Home's counsel 
that the trial court was not put on adequate notice of Aetna's 
objections is disingenuous. Home's counsel was present during 
numerous and lengthy conferences with the trial judge regarding 
jury instructions, Special Verdict form, and the Special 
Interrogatories. In fact, so much time was devoted to these 
conferences that they were held on the Saturday before the case 
was presented to the jury and on evenings following court 
sessions, after the court staff and court reporter had gone 
home. (R. at 2917.58.) Before the instructions were 
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presented to the jury, the court instructed counsel off the 
record that it was only necessary to state the subject matter 
of the objectionable instructions, rather than the specific 
numbers, because the reasons for the objections had already 
been discussed during the previous conferences and the court 
was in a hurry to submit the case to the jury. R. at 
2917.59. 
1. Proposed Jury Instructions No. 2 and No. 42. 
With regard to Instruction Nos. 2 and 42, Aetna's 
counsel tried briefly to state reasons for objections, despite 
the court's instructions, in order to create at least a basic 
record of the basis for such objections. When Aetna's 
objection to the failure to give proposed Instruction No. 2 is 
considered in light of the text of that instruction 
(mismanagement as a sole and proximate cause of loss), there is 
no question as to Aetna's concern. The failure to give the 
instruction left the jury with no affirmative away to rule in 
Aetna's favor on its primary factual defense. 
Aetna's objection on the court's failure to give 
proposed Instruction No. 42 was likewise adequate. That 
instruction, and the concept of officers and directors being a 
contributing cause of Home's losses, was a repeated and major 
topic of both the evidence and the in camera conferences. 
When the objection was made on the record, the trial court's 
awareness of its substance was demonstrated by its asking only 
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for clarification of Aetna's burden of proof on that issue. 
(R. at 2917.63 1. 23-25.) 
2. Objectionable Jury Instructions Nos. 26-30. 
Under Rule 51, it is the duty of the trial court to 
cover the theories of both parties in its instructions. To 
determine if this is accomplished, the instructions must be 
considered as a whole. Startin v. Madsen. 237 P.2d 834, 836 
(Utah 1951). Except for Instruction No. 29, which was not 
individually objectional, Jury Instructions Nos. 26 through 30, 
when taken as a whole, misled the jury. Because of those 
instructions, the jury concluded that it was entirely precluded 
from considering whether management7s involvement in the AFCO 
investor loans was a cause of Home Savings' losses. This 
explains the jury's frustration. After hearing weeks' of 
testimony about mismanagement, the trial court gave the jury no 
way to use such information. The cumulative effect of Jury 
Instructions Nos. 26 through 30 is reviewable under Rule 51, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows the court to 
exercise review at its discretion and in the interests of 
justice. 
3. Special Verdict Form. 
The rule is that "if . . . the court omits any issue 
of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each 
party waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue so 
omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its 
-48 
submission to the jury." Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 49. 
Aetna submitted a proposed Special Verdict form which contained 
the following Question No. 6: 
Did any loss sustained by Home Savings 
directly result from the mismanagement, 
misconduct, and/or failure to follow safe 
and sound lending practices? 
(R. at 1219.) It is true that Aetna's counsel prepared the 
final Special Verdict form in order to relieve typing demands 
on the court staff, but it did so with instruction from the 
trial court as to the final form the Verdict would take. By 
accommodating the court's need for additional typing resources, 
Aetna certainly did not waive its prior Rule 49 demand that 
Question No. 6 be presented to the jury. 
4. Review of Error by Court of Appeals. 
Even if the objections stated in the record are found 
to be deficient, this court, "in its discretion and in the 
interests of justice, may review the giving or failure to give 
an instruction." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51. 
Where Aetna presented substantial evidence in support of its 
theory of causation, it was entitled to have the issue 
submitted to the jury. The circumstances limiting the 
opportunity to make a more complete statement of the nature of 
its objections, and the fact that the instructions taken as 
whole prevented the jury from addressing the issue, dictate 
that Aetna be granted a new trial. 
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C. Aetna Was Prejudiced by the Special Verdict Form and the 
Jury Instructions as Given. 
Aetna was prejudiced by the combination of omitted 
instructions (proposed Nos. 2 and 42), the effect of the 
instructions actually given (Nos. 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26), and 
the truncated Special Verdict without Aetna's proposed question 
No. 6. The primary way to demonstrate that prejudice is to 
show what the jury would have decided had it understood and 
been presented the opportunity to do so. For that purpose, the 
juror affidavits were obtained. R. at 2032-53, 2055-57. 
(Copies of the juror affidavits are included at Tab J of 
Aetna's Document Addendum.) The jury in this case bemoaned the 
fact the case had been "taken away from it" by the instructions 
and limited verdict. 
Of course, prejudice can also be determined by 
independent analysis of the reviewing court. Even without the 
jurors' direct comments, it is evident that Aetna's causation 
theories were omitted from the jury's consideration. Where a 
defendant's primary factual defense is presented to the finder 
of fact only as the unspoken negative of the plaintiff's case, 
the prejudice is patent. The case should be remanded for a 
fair determination based upon an equal explanation of the 
competing theories of the case. 
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POINT VI 
WITHOUT F&D MARYLAND AS A PARTY, 
COMPLETE RELIEF WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO AETNA. 
F&D was a necessary party to the action because "in 
[its] absence, complete relief cannot be accorded among those 
already parties." Rule 19, U.R.Civ.P. A primary issue 
throughout the case was coverage based upon discovery under the 
Standard Form 22's objective and per se standards. 
(Rider 6091.) Specifically, Aetna contracted with Home to 
cover only losses discovered within the period of its 
coverage. Standard Form 22 specifically excludes coverage for 
losses discovered i inder prior or subsequent policies. To the 
extent the ioss in this case was caused by employee infidelity 
(Rider 6041), coverage was only available under F&D's prior 
bond because i t v* as the contract i n place when Home made its 
discovery. 
The trial court was unable to read Aetna's policy 
correctly in the absence of F&D as a party. For instance, on 
the Section 11 issue, the trial concluded before trial that 
Aetna's position would enable an insurer to collect premiums 
for providing no coverage. This conclusion ignored the 
circumstances of the case. There was coverage, to the extent 
there was a valid fidelity claim. But it was F&D which 
collected premiums from Home in exchange for that coverage. 
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The trial court also became tangled up in Home's 
Section 11 argument of "prior" and "subsequent" losses. That 
distinction was only relevant to coverage under F&D's policy. 
See. Point I, above; C. Douglas Wilson & Co. v. Insurance 
Co. of North America. 464 F. Supp. 1, 17 (D.S.C. 1977), 
aff'd., 590 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 444 
U.S. 831. But the trial court lost sight of the correct 
analysis because of F&D's absence from the case. 
The prejudice to Aetna from F&D's absence is apparent 
in the trial court's skewed analysis. The issue at trial 
should not have been whether there was or was not coverage 
under the Aetna Bond. The proper analysis should have been 
whether coverage was barred by both bonds because of 
management's participation (Point V) or the trading exclusion 
(Point IV), and if not, which of the losses were covered by 
F&D's policy. The obvious prejudice is grounds for reversal. 
POINT VII 
A JUDGMENT MUST ACCURATELY 
REFLECT THE ACTUAL DAMAGES PROVEN AT TRIAL. 
Home Savings does not contest the $237,760.77 of 
actual monetary benefit it received from proceeds of the 36 
AFCO investor loans. Instead, Home argues that the issue was a 
jury question, and that by failing to explicitly reserve the 
issue Aetna waived its right to have the trial court include 
the setoff in calculation of the judgment. 
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This position is directly contrary to the one Home 
took in the trial rourt There, it agreed that the calculation 
of damages was a matter reserved to the trial court. 
By stipulation of counsel, the jury was not 
asked to identify a loss amount 
attributable to each loan, nor to add 
losses in order to calculate damages. 
(Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Proposed Judgment, R. at 
18 0.3 ) The fact of this agreement is demonstrated by the 
complete absence in the Stipulated Pretrial Order of any amount 
of damages or any affirmative submission of damages to the jury 
as a disputed issue of fact. The reservation of damages is 
also supported by the form of the Special Verdict, which makes 
no mention of the amount of the AFCO investor loans. 
Presumably, Home would not be satisfied with a judgment based 
solely on the jury's determinations, as they include no measure 
of actual monetary damages. 
The truth of the matter is that the parties reserved 
a number of issues in this very complicated case for 
determination after trial. This was consistent with Home's 
prior course of conduct in the Armitaae case. In Armitacre, 
as here, the jury was simply asked to enter a special verdict 
on liability- (R. at 1347-1350; copy at Tab C of Aetna's 
Document Addendum.) The calculation of damages was reserved 
for the trial court, which ironed out the complicated issues of 
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accounting, including proper setoffs, after trial. (See 
Armitaae Judgment on Special Verdict, Tr. Ex. 330.) 
There being no issue as to the amount of Home 
Savings' benefit from the AFCO investor loan as reflected in 
Trial Exhibit 83, the question for appeal is whether the trial 
court entered a judgment which is fair and accurate on the 
basis of the evidence. The answer is "no." The proper 
approach to this type of situation is demonstrated in Everhart 
v. Drake Management, Inc., 627 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1980). In 
that case, the court held that a fidelity bond did not cover 
shortfalls in one account when the insured made a business 
decision to apply limited funds to other accounts. 
[The insured] suffered no increase in 
liability as a result of the permanent 
investment funds being deposited to a 
general company account. [The insured] 
merely experienced a shifting of 
liabilities for which it was not entitled 
to recover against the Insurer. Fidelity 
& Deposit Co. v. Usaform Hail Pool, Inc., 
463 F.2d 4, 5 (5th Cir. 1972). 
Id. at 691. 
In the present case, Home Savings consciously took 
almost a quarter of a million dollars of revenue from the AFCO 
investor loans and allocated it to its other business 
purposes. (Tr. Ex. 83.) As previously shown, the purpose of 
the Bond is not to cover losses which naturally arise from 
management decisions and the ups and downs of ordinary 
business. An insured should not be allowed to increase a 
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covered loss by its choices of revenue allocation. If the 
Court, of Appeals does not reverse the trial court's judgment on 
the basis of the foregoing points, it should remand with 
instructions to reduce the judgment by $237,760.77, which was 
Home Savi ngs' profi t from the AFCO i i ivestor loans as reflected 
in Home's own Trial Exhibit No. 83. 
POINT VIII 
HOME SAVINGS IS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION 
FOR THE LEGAL FEES AWARDED TO THE ARMITAGE PLAINTIFFS 
NOR THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' 
FEES INCURRED IN DEFENDING THE ARMITAGE LITIGATION. 
A. Home Savings is not Entitled to Indemnification of Legal 
Fees Awarded to the Armitaae Plaintiffs. 
Home cannot recover the amount it paid the Armitaae 
plaintiffs7 for legal fees ($190,647.31), because those fees 
derived from claims which are expressly excluded from bond 
coverage. Fees were awarded under the Utah Securities law, 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(1)(b) and violation of the 
truth-in-lending laws (see 15 U.S.C.A. §1640(a)(3); and Utah 
Code Ann, % 70b-5-203(1)(c)). Of course, violations of 
securities laws are excluded by the Bond's trading exclusion. 
(See Point IV, above.) And the losses from violatipns of 
truth-in-lending laws were caused by Home's officers, Bill Cox 
and Elaine Reese. 
The evidence shows that Elaine Reese, a corporate 
officer of Home (R. at 2903.116, 11. 9-12) who was responsible 
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for preparing the loan closing documents (R. at 2093.121 1. 8), 
initially backdated loan documents at the direction of her 
immediate superior, Bill Cox (R. at 2903.112, 11. 2-12). 
Subsequent violations, even if influenced by Larry Glad, were 
caused by Elaine Reese because Larry Glad had no authority to 
instruct her to backdate loan documents and she did not work 
for him. (R. at 2903.151, 11. 20-25.) She also failed to get 
approval from her supervisor, Bill Cox, for any backdating of 
documents after the first loan. (R. at 2903.113, 11. 10-12; 
2903.112, 11. 16-17.) Prior to trial, Home specifically 
elected to limit its claim to only those losses caused by Larry 
Glad. (Stipulated Pretrial Order, R. at 719-731.) And the 
jury was instructed that only losses caused by Larry Glad would 
be covered. (Jury Instruction No. 22.) Therefore, even if 
losses from the truth-in-lending violations were covered by the 
Bond, Home's claim does not reach them. 
B. Home Savings May Not be Awarded Legal Fees Incurred in 
Defending the Annitage Litigation for Losses That are Not 
Covered by the Bond. 
The purpose of Aetna's stipulating to the 
reasonableness of $437,500 for Home's Armitaae defense costs 
was to establish actual amounts, while preserving the issue 
of ultimate entitlement based on legal issues of coverage under 
the Bond. (Stipulation, R. at 2850-2853.) Aetna reserved the 
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right to appeal which part, if any, of the reasonable legal 
fees are actually attributable to claims covered under the Bond. 
The trial court erred in finding that the fees for 
the Armitage defense were wholly covered under the Bond. The 
Armitage verdict was based on cla :i ms wh i ch were i lot covered 
by the Bond, i.e., securities and truth-in-lending 
violations. Aetna's liability, if any, to Home for defense 
costs in the Armitage litigation should be limited to the 
proportion of fees attributable to covered allegations, and it 
should not include fees and costs for losses outside the Bond's 
coverage. 
CONCLUSION 
In this appeal, a favorable decision on any of 
Aetna's first four points (Points I-IV), requires reversal of 
the trial court's decision and the entry of judgment in 
Aetna's favor. Those points are absolute defenses. Section 11 
of the Bond barred Home's claim against Aetna because Home knew 
Larry Glad was dishonest before it contracted with Aetna. 
Aetna never accepted any risks or premiums related to that 
known dishonest employee. Home also "discovered,f its loss, as 
that term is defined in the contract, during the F&D bond 
period. In addition, Home failed to disclose either Glad's 
dishonesty or its actual and pending losses on the AFCO 
investor loans in the Aetna Bond Application process. And 
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finally, the transactions for which Home was held liable in 
Armitaae constituted trading in securities, which were 
excluded from coverage. 
If the Court disagrees with all the preceding points, 
then the case should nevertheless be remanded for further 
proceedings on two separate grounds. The conduct of Home's 
management constituted a separate or superseding cause of 
Home's losses, and a jury should be allowed to make that 
determination. (Point V.) In addition, F&D was an 
indispensable party to this action, and the jury should have 
had the opportunity to decide which of the two sureties (if 
either) should have provided coverage. (Point VI.) If the 
Court of Appeals does not agree that all of the foregoing 
points entitle Aetna to a favorable ruling, then Home's 
judgment should be reduced as set forth in Points VII 
and VIII. 
A just and equitable result requires reversal of the 
trial court's rulings and judgment with instructions to enter 
judgment in Aetna's favor based on one or more of the sound 
points of this appeal. 
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